I'm going away for three days to get lots of writing done!
My goals:
(1) a literature review on TE as a kind of transfer. What is TE? What has Pugh (et al) said about the relationship between TE and transfer? and check out the Jornet, roth, etc. and Nemirovsky articles in drafting this review.
(2) a literature review on transfer (see above) that does not include TE
(3) a literature review on IC
If time, or if I need to switch gears:
- more IC coding.
Other goals:
I have a nice list of history-of-___ (STEM topic) books to review for the fall. So I can read good books recommended by friends at night. I AM SO EXCITED.
Friday, May 20, 2016
Thursday, May 12, 2016
Blogging Goldstone & Wilensky
Okay - I read Goldstone and Wilensky (R. L. Goldstone and U. Wilensky, J. of the Learning Sc. 17, 465 (2008)) and got to feeling a little blue because it does what I want to do but better. I told Angie I'd blog about it and -- voila -- not so blue!
Here's the major difference between what they do and what I think the IC paper could do:
- G&W are interested in a kind of transfer that involves "seeing" complex systems formalisms/ generalizations across disparate domains. Students develop some powerful ideas around complex systems (e.g. what "positive feedback" is) in one idealized but concrete scenario; in doing so they can now "see" this in other complex systems. They have a lovely description of the "flexible perception of similarity" which I love and does, I think, connect.
- I am interested - or at least noticing - that what students "transfer" is often not a generalization or a set of principles, but, instead, "activity." - They share ideas with peers, notice things that are brought into class, continue experiments when appropriate, wonder about new phenomena, etc. Some reasons for this difference in our focus is that, in the inquiry class, we build towards "principles" (or "rules of light") but they often don't exist for quite some time. It's also something that is not widely applicable to other (non-light) phenomena, the way that complex systems principles are. On the other hand, it is applicable to a LOT of phenomena. (And Janeal mentioned thinking about the 'shadow' of water.)
One thing I want to take-away from G&W has to do with the determination of "near" v. "far" -- and I think that Engle does this, too: similarity is a flexible idea; so, too, is near- and far- transfer. Intercontextuality turns "far" transfer into "near" transfer or even not transfer at all. Maddy at Walgreens, for example. Are those two ideas (similarity and transfer dimensions) something I could link?
Some quotes and thoughts from the paper...
1. They begin with the idea of a "grounded generalization" --
p.467: Instead [of formalisms], we propose learning and teaching methods that promote situation construals that are concrete insofar as they are perceptually, temporally, and spatially grounded. However, they are still idealizations in that many elements of a situation are ignored or highly simplified. In this article, our argument for how to achieve grounded generalizations involves the following steps: (1) Describe the nature of complex systems accounts of science, (2) provide examples of general complex systems principles that appear in several case studies, (3) describe pedagogical benefits of teaching science through complex systems, (4) discuss the importance of transfer and generalization in relation to complex systems, (5) present a method for achieving generalization through perceptually grounded yet interpreted simulations, and (6) compare generalization from grounded simulations to formalism-centered strategies and other methods for achieving transfer.
Me: I think we begin with a particular, puzzling problem that lends itself to "idealizations:" how the eye works, the pinhole theater, color. But we do not begin with the idealization. I often quote Polya "there's an easier problem you can solve. Find it." -- and these "easier" problems are idealizations (a single lens with a single bulb) of the more complex problem.
2. They argue for the "why" of attention to complex systems:
p. 472: The principles of complex systems are naturally applicable in many, often seemingly unrelated, situations. This is because the principles are expressed in generic terms such as element, agent, resource, inhibition, excitation, interactions, connection, motion, force, neighbor, energy, and strength.
? is that true?
Me: I argue for something that is ubiquitous, too, but not at the level of "principles" or other abstractions, but at the level of phenomenon: light, color, eyes, sound, astronomy (moon, sun) are the kinds of things you will interact with across your life ... I think this is probably also true of complex systems, but it's a slightly different argument.
3. "STRATEGIES FOR PROMOTING TRANSPORTABLE UNDERSTANDINGS"
Here I think is a big difference between the usual discussion of "transfer" and what I'm interested in and noticing with my class: my students, I would say, are "thinking about" these ideas all the time, but not in a way that I would call "transportable understandings." That is, when I look at Andy, Maddy, the "haunts you" comments -- I think what is "transporting" is "activity" of some sort -- noticing, talking, wondering, etc., and not (always, usually?) "understanding." So much of our class is mired in NOT understanding and cultivating curiosity.
4. LOVE THIS
p. 478: "In their own published research, mathematicians tend to provide formal proofs but not the visuospatial inspiration for the proofs. This has led mathematicians to complain that the true heart of the proof, the intuitive conceptualization, is ignored in the formal description of the proof steps themselves (Hadamard, 1949). The scholarly articles contain the step-by-step, formally sanctioned steps, but if one wishes to understand where the idea for these steps comes from, then one must attempt to generate the underlying idea oneself, without much insight from the published report. The exterior face of mathematics is presented without revealing the skeleton that is the source of the fa- cial structures. This tendency to hide the conceptual structure has spread from the research to educational mathematical community."
... and then he goes on to cite my favorite Lakoff & Nunez. love. and yet I can't figure out if what follows is critique or not??
5. The Flexible Perception of Similarity
This, I think, is so closely related to the dissertation I wrote ... and makes me a little sad about my lack of publications!...
"An important plank of our proposal is that the similarity between situations governed by the same complex systems principle can be used to promote transfer even if the situations are dissimilar to the untutored eye, and even if the similarity is not explicitly noticed. This claim apparently contradicts the empirical evidence for very limited transfer between remote situations (Detterman, 1993; Reed, Ernst, & Banerji, 1974; but see also Barnett & Ceci, 2002, for a balanced evaluation of the evidence). In fact, our claim is that the perceived similarity of situations is malleable, not fixed by objective properties of the situations themselves."
"One reason why skeptics doubt remote transfer is because of a focus on analytic and explicit transfer. It may be difficult to get people to analytically bring to mind previously learned schemas (Gick & Holyoak, 1983). Instead, we propose to teach people ways of looking at situations that become natural perceptual habits. When we say looking, we mean perception, but we also mean using representations to encode situations—just as telescopes and microscopes extend perception, so cognitive technologies [like Agent Based Modeling? is this a technology or a "cognitive technology"?] can extend perception by giving people representations that extend their abilities to encode situations. diSessa and Sherin (1998) also emphasized the importance of perceptual shifts for achieving conceptual change and argued that these shifts may be both perceptual and interpretational: “In many instances this seeing is a substantial accomplishment of learning and will depend only very partially on basic perceptual capabilities” (p. 1172). In this extended sense of perceptual learning, acquiring diagramming techniques such as Euler Circles for logic, Cayley diagrams for group theory, and Feynman diagrams for quantum field theory are all methods for changing perception so that it becomes sensitive to otherwise obscure and esoteric properties of a situation."
Here's the major difference between what they do and what I think the IC paper could do:
- G&W are interested in a kind of transfer that involves "seeing" complex systems formalisms/ generalizations across disparate domains. Students develop some powerful ideas around complex systems (e.g. what "positive feedback" is) in one idealized but concrete scenario; in doing so they can now "see" this in other complex systems. They have a lovely description of the "flexible perception of similarity" which I love and does, I think, connect.
- I am interested - or at least noticing - that what students "transfer" is often not a generalization or a set of principles, but, instead, "activity." - They share ideas with peers, notice things that are brought into class, continue experiments when appropriate, wonder about new phenomena, etc. Some reasons for this difference in our focus is that, in the inquiry class, we build towards "principles" (or "rules of light") but they often don't exist for quite some time. It's also something that is not widely applicable to other (non-light) phenomena, the way that complex systems principles are. On the other hand, it is applicable to a LOT of phenomena. (And Janeal mentioned thinking about the 'shadow' of water.)
One thing I want to take-away from G&W has to do with the determination of "near" v. "far" -- and I think that Engle does this, too: similarity is a flexible idea; so, too, is near- and far- transfer. Intercontextuality turns "far" transfer into "near" transfer or even not transfer at all. Maddy at Walgreens, for example. Are those two ideas (similarity and transfer dimensions) something I could link?
Some quotes and thoughts from the paper...
1. They begin with the idea of a "grounded generalization" --
p.467: Instead [of formalisms], we propose learning and teaching methods that promote situation construals that are concrete insofar as they are perceptually, temporally, and spatially grounded. However, they are still idealizations in that many elements of a situation are ignored or highly simplified. In this article, our argument for how to achieve grounded generalizations involves the following steps: (1) Describe the nature of complex systems accounts of science, (2) provide examples of general complex systems principles that appear in several case studies, (3) describe pedagogical benefits of teaching science through complex systems, (4) discuss the importance of transfer and generalization in relation to complex systems, (5) present a method for achieving generalization through perceptually grounded yet interpreted simulations, and (6) compare generalization from grounded simulations to formalism-centered strategies and other methods for achieving transfer.
Me: I think we begin with a particular, puzzling problem that lends itself to "idealizations:" how the eye works, the pinhole theater, color. But we do not begin with the idealization. I often quote Polya "there's an easier problem you can solve. Find it." -- and these "easier" problems are idealizations (a single lens with a single bulb) of the more complex problem.
2. They argue for the "why" of attention to complex systems:
p. 472: The principles of complex systems are naturally applicable in many, often seemingly unrelated, situations. This is because the principles are expressed in generic terms such as element, agent, resource, inhibition, excitation, interactions, connection, motion, force, neighbor, energy, and strength.
? is that true?
Me: I argue for something that is ubiquitous, too, but not at the level of "principles" or other abstractions, but at the level of phenomenon: light, color, eyes, sound, astronomy (moon, sun) are the kinds of things you will interact with across your life ... I think this is probably also true of complex systems, but it's a slightly different argument.
3. "STRATEGIES FOR PROMOTING TRANSPORTABLE UNDERSTANDINGS"
Here I think is a big difference between the usual discussion of "transfer" and what I'm interested in and noticing with my class: my students, I would say, are "thinking about" these ideas all the time, but not in a way that I would call "transportable understandings." That is, when I look at Andy, Maddy, the "haunts you" comments -- I think what is "transporting" is "activity" of some sort -- noticing, talking, wondering, etc., and not (always, usually?) "understanding." So much of our class is mired in NOT understanding and cultivating curiosity.
4. LOVE THIS
p. 478: "In their own published research, mathematicians tend to provide formal proofs but not the visuospatial inspiration for the proofs. This has led mathematicians to complain that the true heart of the proof, the intuitive conceptualization, is ignored in the formal description of the proof steps themselves (Hadamard, 1949). The scholarly articles contain the step-by-step, formally sanctioned steps, but if one wishes to understand where the idea for these steps comes from, then one must attempt to generate the underlying idea oneself, without much insight from the published report. The exterior face of mathematics is presented without revealing the skeleton that is the source of the fa- cial structures. This tendency to hide the conceptual structure has spread from the research to educational mathematical community."
... and then he goes on to cite my favorite Lakoff & Nunez. love. and yet I can't figure out if what follows is critique or not??
5. The Flexible Perception of Similarity
This, I think, is so closely related to the dissertation I wrote ... and makes me a little sad about my lack of publications!...
"An important plank of our proposal is that the similarity between situations governed by the same complex systems principle can be used to promote transfer even if the situations are dissimilar to the untutored eye, and even if the similarity is not explicitly noticed. This claim apparently contradicts the empirical evidence for very limited transfer between remote situations (Detterman, 1993; Reed, Ernst, & Banerji, 1974; but see also Barnett & Ceci, 2002, for a balanced evaluation of the evidence). In fact, our claim is that the perceived similarity of situations is malleable, not fixed by objective properties of the situations themselves."
"One reason why skeptics doubt remote transfer is because of a focus on analytic and explicit transfer. It may be difficult to get people to analytically bring to mind previously learned schemas (Gick & Holyoak, 1983). Instead, we propose to teach people ways of looking at situations that become natural perceptual habits. When we say looking, we mean perception, but we also mean using representations to encode situations—just as telescopes and microscopes extend perception, so cognitive technologies [like Agent Based Modeling? is this a technology or a "cognitive technology"?] can extend perception by giving people representations that extend their abilities to encode situations. diSessa and Sherin (1998) also emphasized the importance of perceptual shifts for achieving conceptual change and argued that these shifts may be both perceptual and interpretational: “In many instances this seeing is a substantial accomplishment of learning and will depend only very partially on basic perceptual capabilities” (p. 1172). In this extended sense of perceptual learning, acquiring diagramming techniques such as Euler Circles for logic, Cayley diagrams for group theory, and Feynman diagrams for quantum field theory are all methods for changing perception so that it becomes sensitive to otherwise obscure and esoteric properties of a situation."
Friday, May 6, 2016
"rehearsal space" ? paper
My writing group colleagues have been suggesting a practitioner paper. I have some ideas about how that might go...
The genius of Newton’s first law — “an object in motion stays in motion unless…” is that it tells us where to put our attention when trying to explain motion. If an object does not change its speed, there is no “why” — there is nothing to explain — that’s just what objects do. What begs explanations is why something changes its speed. That's when you can start poking around and finding forces responsible.
A similar thing, perhaps, could be said of transfer: “a student will transfer ideas across space and time unless…”. In this way, the thing to understand about the problem of transfer is why this thing that is so common in our everyday lives, as we are forever encountering novel situations and transferring prior learning to make sense of them, is so rare in classrooms and in psychology studies. While many researchers attend to things we can do to facilitate transfer, it may be worthwhile to examine the things school settings do that limit transfer.
To some degree, I believe, this has been answered in Engestrom’s account of the “encapsulation” of school learning, describing how students’ learning of the phases of the moon is not, in fact, about the moon at all — but about understanding and interpreting the textbook. The characteristics of traditional classrooms: a single age group, textbooks, the walls, the desks, the chairs, the lone teacher at the front, the tests, the discourse structures (IRE, say), the “lab” equipment (a graduated cylinder when a cup measure would do; a triple beam balance when a kitchen scale would work, etc.), the attention to problems that are never part of everyday ponderings (a ball rolling down a ramp, the pH of some solution, measuring the index of refraction) — are all characteristics of school and school only. If we wanted to limit transfer, we would do well to send someone to school.
If we want to encourage transfer, then, to me, this means that we want to set up an environment that encourages intercontextuality: where conversations look like those you might have in an out-of-class setting, where the roles you take on are ones you can imagine using in other environments, where the materials you use are perhaps repurposed, but are the kinds of things you find in a range of contexts, where the problems are ones that exist outside of school, and where the ways of talking feel like your "own" ways of talking in other settings.
One way of thinking about a classroom, particularly if what you're after is "transfer," is that the classroom is a rehearsal space for later activity. And, as with any good dress rehearsal, the more you can make the classroom similar to the transfer context -- in as many ways possible -- the better. In the theater, a dress rehearsal will attend to things like lighting, props, costumes, timing, maybe even a small audience of friends and family. What would a "rehearsal space" of a classroom look like? ...
The challenge, I think, is how to make that continuous with "science." Though science may be nothing more than "the refinement of everyday thinking" (Einstein and Hammer), it is in that refinement that science becomes a separate kind of thing. Continuous with is not synonymous with.
The genius of Newton’s first law — “an object in motion stays in motion unless…” is that it tells us where to put our attention when trying to explain motion. If an object does not change its speed, there is no “why” — there is nothing to explain — that’s just what objects do. What begs explanations is why something changes its speed. That's when you can start poking around and finding forces responsible.
A similar thing, perhaps, could be said of transfer: “a student will transfer ideas across space and time unless…”. In this way, the thing to understand about the problem of transfer is why this thing that is so common in our everyday lives, as we are forever encountering novel situations and transferring prior learning to make sense of them, is so rare in classrooms and in psychology studies. While many researchers attend to things we can do to facilitate transfer, it may be worthwhile to examine the things school settings do that limit transfer.
To some degree, I believe, this has been answered in Engestrom’s account of the “encapsulation” of school learning, describing how students’ learning of the phases of the moon is not, in fact, about the moon at all — but about understanding and interpreting the textbook. The characteristics of traditional classrooms: a single age group, textbooks, the walls, the desks, the chairs, the lone teacher at the front, the tests, the discourse structures (IRE, say), the “lab” equipment (a graduated cylinder when a cup measure would do; a triple beam balance when a kitchen scale would work, etc.), the attention to problems that are never part of everyday ponderings (a ball rolling down a ramp, the pH of some solution, measuring the index of refraction) — are all characteristics of school and school only. If we wanted to limit transfer, we would do well to send someone to school.
If we want to encourage transfer, then, to me, this means that we want to set up an environment that encourages intercontextuality: where conversations look like those you might have in an out-of-class setting, where the roles you take on are ones you can imagine using in other environments, where the materials you use are perhaps repurposed, but are the kinds of things you find in a range of contexts, where the problems are ones that exist outside of school, and where the ways of talking feel like your "own" ways of talking in other settings.
One way of thinking about a classroom, particularly if what you're after is "transfer," is that the classroom is a rehearsal space for later activity. And, as with any good dress rehearsal, the more you can make the classroom similar to the transfer context -- in as many ways possible -- the better. In the theater, a dress rehearsal will attend to things like lighting, props, costumes, timing, maybe even a small audience of friends and family. What would a "rehearsal space" of a classroom look like? ...
The challenge, I think, is how to make that continuous with "science." Though science may be nothing more than "the refinement of everyday thinking" (Einstein and Hammer), it is in that refinement that science becomes a separate kind of thing. Continuous with is not synonymous with.
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